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Personal and Official Authority: Turn-of-
the-Century Lawyers and the Dissenting
Opinion
Hunter Smith
A dissenting opinion ... has nothing more than individual authority. By
the suppression of dissenting opinions and statements of dissent space
will be economized in our reports; and the dignity and influence of our
judicial decisions will be greatly enhanced.'
Around the turn of the last century, many American lawyers wanted to
ban dissenting opinions in all courts of last resort. They derided dissenting
opinions as a pernicious waste of time, one that caused uncertainty in the
law, shook the public's faith in the courts and was fundamentally
inconsistent with the nature of judicial authority. A dissenting opinion,
they claimed, was no more than a statement by a judge as individual, but
such statements should not be published in law reports. Though the idea
never got very far-only one state prohibited the publication of dissenting
opinions in official reports-the debate over whether to publish dissent
engaged the energies of leading legal periodicals, bar associations, judges
and lawyers for a considerable span of years.
The turn-of-the-century controversy over the publication of dissenting
opinions has escaped contemporary academic attention. To the extent that
the criticism of dissenting opinions has appeared in scholarship at all, it
has been understood as an example of "classical legal thought."2 As one
account puts it, because classical legal thought strove to portray "law [as]
neutral, objective and prepolitical," it was embarrassed by and adamantly
opposed to the public expression of judicial disagreement.3 In an article
on the opinion-writing practices of the Taft Supreme Court, Robert Post
quotes some of the lawyers from this earlier era who inveighed against the
* I would like to thank Nicholas Parrillo for many productive conversations and for timely
encouragement on several drafts. I am also indebted to John Langbein, Jerry Mashaw, Robert Post,
Judith Resnik, Reva Siegel, John Witt, Christopher Casey, Joanna Erdman, Zoe Griffith, Michacla
Hailbronner, and the participants of the Yale Law Teaching/Yale Law Women workshop who all read
and commented on this Article in various stages of its development.
1. Current Topics, 10ALB. L.J. 324, 325 (1874).
2. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE BIRTH OF THE MODERN CONSTITUTION: THE UNITED
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publication of dissent.4 He too uses turn-of-the-century articles opposed to
the publication of judicial dissent as examples of "a jurisprudential
understanding of the nature of law [as] a grid of fixed and certain
principles designed for the settlement of disputes,"' an understanding
which he argues the members of the Taft Court gradually abandoned.
Their authors' sights set elsewhere, such accounts tell only part of the
story. They do not observe that articles criticizing dissenting opinions
were not isolated polemics but were instead part of a roughly thirty-year
debate within the Bar on the propriety of published judicial dissent.
Further, though classical "jurisprudential understanding[s] of the nature of
law" 6 may have motivated or undergirded the desire to abolish dissent,
many of those who argued about dissenting opinions in the nineteenth
century reasoned about their disagreement in terms of different
understandings of the nature of courts as institutions and the nature of the
judicial office. Dissent's would-be abolishers promoted a vision of courts
as composite institutions into which judges' individuality should be
merged, while defenders of dissent reasoned from the notion that courts
should speak as collections of individual judges. Dissent's opponents
argued that judges should maintain a stricter separation between their
private views and their official pronouncements of the law in law reports,
while those enamored of dissent celebrated dissenting opinions as
expressions of judges' authentic personality and virtuous character.
As anyone familiar with contemporary American courts could say,
dissents' would-be abolishers failed spectacularly. They failed on an
institutional level in that the publication of dissenting opinions by
American judges is today an accepted and largely unchallenged practice.
But their failure was also discursive in that their desire for courts to speak
as anonymous, composite, and impersonal institutions runs counter to one
of the main discourses on judicial legitimacy today. When lawyers in the
1980s and 1990s expressed an anxiety that the federal judiciary was
becoming bureaucratized, they worried that they could no longer detect
individual responsibility or superior traits of personal character behind
judicial decisionmaking. American jurists now seemed unanimous in their
belief that the personal, non-institutional character of judging was
essential to judicial legitimacy.
This Article examines how lawyers at both ends of the twentieth
century discussed the nature of judicial authority in terms of whether it
4. Robert Post, The Supreme Court Opinion as Institutional Practice: Dissent, Legal Scholarship,
and Decisionmaking in the Taft Court, 85 MINN. L. REv. 1267 (2001).
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was personal or impersonal. Lawyers wrestling with the question of
published dissent in the nineteenth century were, of course, dealing with a
different institutional feature of the judiciary than lawyers concerned
about the diffusion of adjudicative responsibility within the federal
judiciary eighty years later. Yet there is an important commonality in
these two groups of lawyers' discussions of the "personal" nature of
judicial authority: both groups of lawyers reasoned about whether it was
desirable for the judicial office to integrate a judge's official role and his
or her private self. Those who argued for a prohibition on dissent argued
that law reports should only contain expressions by judges in their official
capacity announcing the law on behalf of the court and should not contain
statements by them as individuals. By contrast, when lawyers later
worried that the federal judiciary had become bureaucratized, they
expressed a concern that adjudication be carried out by judges who acted
not only in their capacity as officials, but also in their capacity as
individuals, guided by personal conscience, experience, and virtue as
well.
The Article proceeds in five parts. Part I examines the late nineteenth-
and early twentieth-century debates over the propriety of published
judicial dissent in courts of last resort. In Part II, I contrast the debate over
dissenting opinions around the turn of the twentieth century with the
discussion of judicial bureaucratization towards the century's end. The
comparison reveals a striking similarity in the terms in which judicial
legitimacy was discussed, as in both episodes lawyers understood the
distinction between personality and impersonality to be essential to
judicial legitimacy. I then situate that distinction in Weberian accounts of
institutional modernization. Though turn-of-the-century opponents of
dissent constructed dissenting opinions as no more than a personal
statement by a judge as an individual, there is of course no reason that
dissenting opinions must be understood as such. As Part III explores, the
publication of dissenting opinions might further a number of different
institutional goals of the judiciary. Part IV explores how the terms in
which turn-of-the-century lawyers opposed dissenting opinions might
suggest the usefulness, and the limitations, of a Weberian framework to
understanding broader changes to nineteenth-century officeholding.
Finally, with the caveat that the rise and fall of diffuse intellectual
movements do not lend themselves to strong causal accounts, this Article
speculates on why the debate over dissenting opinions died off when it
did and why lawyers were attracted to a vision of judicial authority as
commingling a judge's personal and official capacities.
5092012]1
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I. DISSENT - THE TURN OF THE CENTURY DEBATE
"A dissenting opinion . . . has nothing more than individual authority.
By the suppression of dissenting opinions and statements of dissent space
will be economized in our reports; and the dignity and influence of our
judicial decisions will be greatly enhanced," 7 opined the Albany Law
Journal in 1874. Frequently editorializing on the topic starting in the
1870s, the Albany Law Journal took interest in the propriety of published
judicial dissent well before most of its contemporaries. By the late 1880s,
other publications had begun to take a stance on whether dissenting
opinions should be published. The exchange of articles culminated in an
explosion of interest around the turn of the century, as bar associations
and law journals across the country earnestly and intensely debated the
question of whether it was proper to allow dissenting opinions to be
published in law reports. Louisiana went so far as to prohibit their
publication by constitutional amendment in 1898; similar steps were
considered in other states.
The opponents of dissenting opinions won few victories, and their
arguments, like those of their adversaries, were often characterized more
by rhetorical bombast than intellectual sophistication. But through their
very grandiloquence, both the defenders and opponents of dissent provide
a window into tensions in the legal profession's understanding of the
nature of judicial and legal authority. As this Part explores, their debate
turned not only on competing understandings of the nature of law, but
also on competing visions of the nature of courts and of the judicial
office. The objection expressed by those opposed to published dissent was
not only that dissenting opinions suggested that law was indeterminate
and that courts might be fallible, but also that courts were corporate units
and that it was therefore inappropriate to publish the private views of a
judge in law reports. By contrast, those who celebrated or defended
dissent promoted an image of courts as collections of individual judges;
they understood dissenting opinions not only to be necessitated by norms
of democratic publicity, but also to be valuable as expressions of
individual conscience by heroic, virtuous judges.'
7. Current Topics, supra note 1.
8. As a prefatory matter, I note some other efforts to suppress dissenting opinions that are
unrelated to the national debate explored in this Article.
The justices of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, as a matter of long-standing tradition,
dissented only rarely in the nineteenth century. See Current Topics, 33 ALB. L.J. 161, 162 (1886).
Although the reasons that this tradition existed in Massachusetts are unclear, the fact of its existence
often surfaced in the debates over dissent in the final third of the nineteenth century. See, e.g., id.;
Current Topics, 33 ALB. L.J. 421, 423 (1886) (explaining that "[w]e are quite willing to off-set the
practice of Massachusetts against this 'Star Chamber' claptrap"); Current Topics, 34 ALB. L.J. 461,
462 (1886) (acknowledging that "a dissenting opinion of the Massachusetts Supreme Court has
510 [Vol. 24:507
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A. To Publish or To Prohibit: Controversy with the Profession
Founded in 1870 and published weekly, the Albany Law Journal was
the country's leading legal periodical in the final third of the nineteenth
century.9 As one contemporary newspaper gushed, "[T]he Albany Law
Journal is the ranking legal publication in the United States and its
editorial utterances have as much weight among the members of the
profession at large as a number of the courts themselves."o Taking
advantage of the improved postal system, the Albany Law Journal was the
most successful of a number of legal periodicals that catered to the
expanded and democratized American bar in the years following the Civil
War. It functioned as a legal variety magazine, its pages filled by reports
of recent cases, flowery essays on legal topics, pompous editorials, and
waggish gossip." Starting in its early years of publication, the Albany
Law Journal persistently "advocated the abandonment of the practice of
reporting dissenting opinions" 2 and did so well into the next century.
Though the Albany Law Journal appears to have taken the lead in the
discussion and its initial pronouncements appear to have gone
unanswered, by the 1880s dissenting opinions had become a hot topic.13
Virtually all the major American legal periodicals engaged in a heated
exchange of editorials over the propriety of dissenting opinions, with the
exchange reaching a crescendo in the period from 1898 to 1906. The
Central Law Journal joined forces with the Albany Law Journal in
arguing that judicial dissent should be prohibited.' 4 These two
recently been published" but observing that the publication was only in "a reporting periodical," not
"in the official volume of reports as yet"); Dissenting Opinions, 22 AM. L. REv. 611, 611 (1888).
Similarly, the Pennsylvania legislature had prohibited the publication of dissenting opinions in the
state's official reporter but to "little avail," see Alex Simpson, Jr., Dissenting Opinions, 71 U. PA. L.
REV. 205, 207-09 (1923), and for reasons that appear unrelated to the later national discussion of
dissent that this Article investigates. See also KY. CONST. OF 1792, art. V, § 4 (noting that "it shall be
the duty of each judge of the supreme court, present at the hearing of any such case, and differing
from a majority of the court, to deliver his opinion in writing").
9. See Irving Browne, I GREEN BAG 509 (1889) (stating that the Albany Law Journal "is
undoubtedly more read and quoted by lawyers and newspapers than any of its contemporaries"). At
the end of its first year of publication, the Law Journal itself claimed to have attained the highest
circulation of any legal periodical in the country. Our Second Volume, 2 ALB. L.J. 1 (1870).
10. BISMARCK DAILY TRIB. (Bismarck, N.D.), June 17, 1891, at 2.
11. See ERWtN SURRENCY, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW PUBLISHING 191-93 (discussing the
rise of general-interest legal periodicals, including the Albany Law Journal after the Civil War);
Michael I. Swygert & Jon W. Bruce, The Historical Origins, Founding, and Early Development of
Student-EditedLaw Reviews, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 736, 751-63 (same).
12. Reporting Dissenting Opinions, 18 ALB. L.J. 284, 284 (1878).
13. As early as 1865, the Law Intelligencer had called dissenting opinions "judicial treason" and
urged reporters not to publish them. Should Dissenting Opinions Be Reported?, reprinted in I UPPER
CAN. L.J. (N.S.) 177-78 (1865).
14. See, e.g., Dissenting Opinions, 22 CENT. L.J. 313, 313 (stating that it "concur[red] very
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publications were supported by articles in the Green Bag,15 the Law
Magazine and Review, 6 the American Lawyer,17 and the Washington Law
Reporter.1 s The defense of the dissenting opinion was led by the
American Law Review, supported by the Southern Law Times' 9 and Law
Notes,20 as well as by articles in the Yale Law JournalP and the American
Law Register,22 among others.23
Newspapers of general circulation took sides as well, 24 and the issue
was taken up at meetings of bar associations across the country. A report
to the Virginia State Bar Association noted that "it is questionable
whether dissenting opinions ought to be reported." 25 The neighbors in
West Virginia were less equivocal: the periodical of that state's bar
association "heartily endorsed" the prohibition of dissenting opinions. 26
Between 1898 and 1904, the bar associations of Tennessee, 2 7 New York,28
Texas, 29 Missouri 30 and Michigan" all heard addresses or committee
15. See William Bowen, Dissenting Opinions, 17 GREEN BAG 690 (1905).
16. See C.A. Hereschoff Bartlett, Dissenting Opinions, 32 L. MAG. & REV. 54 (1906).
17. See Henry Wollman, Stability of the Law-The Income Tax Case, 6 AM. LAW. 48 (1898).
18. See Dissenting Opinions, 15 WASH. L. REP. 650 (1878). North of the border, the Canada Law
Journal weighed in against dissenting opinions, but seemed to reveal some confusion on its part as to
what they actually were. See Dissenting Judgments, 39 CAN. L.J. (N.S.) 423 (1903).
19. See Current Topics, 33 ALB. L.J. 261, 261 (1886) (quoting Southern Law Times's support for
dissenting opinions).
20. Unanimity ofJudicial Opinion, L. NOTES 284 (1905).
21. See, e.g., Editorials, 6 YALE L.J. 155, 156 (1897).
22. See Notes on Recent Leading Articles in Leading Periodicals, 54 AM. L. REG. 61, 63 (1906).
23. Case and Comment, meanwhile, was one of the few legal periodicals not to have taken a clear
stance on the issue. See Dissenting Opinions, 4 CASE & COMMENT 99 (1898) (discussing arguments
in debate over dissenting opinions without clearly taking sides); see also Dissenting Opinions, 19
HARV. L. REV. 309, 309 (1906) (weakly defending dissenting opinions).
24. See, e.g., Dissenting Opinions, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 16, 1908, at 8; Dissenting Opinions,
TRENTON EVENING TIMES, Aug. 5, 1898, at 4; Dissenting Opinions from the Bench, HARTFORD
COURANT, Jan. 25, 1904, at 10; EVENING POST (N.Y.C.), Nov. 29, 1886, at 2; From Bench and Bar,
N.Y. TRIB., Oct. 26, 1890, at 19; The Dissenting Opinions, HARTFORD COURANT, Mar. 14, 1904, at 9;
Letter to the Editor, Uncertainty of the Law, S.F. DAILY BULL., Apr. 2, 1890, at 2; The Value of
Judicial Dissent, S.F. DAILY EVENING BULL., Apr. 4, 1890, at 2; see also Emlin McLain, Dissenting
Opinions, 14 YALE L.J. 191, 191 (1905) (noting concern over dissenting opinions by non-lawyers);
Should Dissenting Opinions of Judges Be Suppressed?, 32 AM. L. REV. 896, 896 (1898) (noting
interest of lay press).
25. Robert M. Hughes, Law Reporting, I VA. L. REG. 309, 312 (1895-96).
26. Dissenting Opinions: A Sane and Forcible Presentation, 14 THE BAR: OFFICIAL J. OF THE
W.V. BAR ASS'N 4, 4 (1907).
27. Caruthers Ewing, Dissenting Opinions, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL
MEETING OF THE BAR ASSOCIATION OF TENNESSEE 106, 111 (1899).
28. Suppression of Dissenting Opinions, 38 AM. L. REV. 911, 911 (1904); see also Program of
the Twenty Sixth Annual Meeting of the New York State Bar Association, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION 673, 676 (1903) (listing as topic for discussion of Committee
on Law Reform, "Should the publication of dissenting opinions be prohibited by law?").
29. PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-SECOND ANNUAL SESSION OF THE TEXAS BAR ASSOCIATION
40(1903).
30. See V.H. Roberts, Dissenting Opinions, in PRESIDENT'S ANNUAL REPORT TO THE BOARD OF
CURATORS (UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI), 1904-1905, at 43 (1905).
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reports on the propriety of dissenting opinions, some advocating their
prohibition, others defending them. The Pennsylvania Bar Association
discussed the matter in 1908,32 while as early as 1886, the influential
Judge John Dillon had secured the adoption of a resolution by the
American Bar Association providing that "it does not deem it practicable
to interfere by legislation to prohibit or limit the publication of any class
of reports."3 3 In 1898, the ABA Committee on Law Reporting and
Digesting, compelled by the "good deal of discussion of late" on the
subject, again defended the publication of dissenting opinions in its report
to the Association.3 4 Even one of the speakers at the first annual meeting
of the Oklahoma and Indian Territory Bar Association advocated the
prohibition of dissenting opinions in their soon-to-be state.35
Louisiana might have become the crowning achievement of those
seeking to ban the dissenting opinion when its 1898 constitution provided
that "[c]oncurring and dissenting opinions shall not be published." 6 The
American Law Review, the periodical that led the defense of dissenting
opinions, scoffed: "So much the worse for Louisiana. That State has had
in times past some unsatisfactory institutions; and now it leads the way in
suppressing light and truth."37 The Washington Post expressed concern
about Louisiana's move to "muzzl[e] dissenting judges,"" while William
Wirt Howe, then president of the American Bar Association and a New
Orleansian himself, noted the development with approval in his annual
address to members. Dissenting opinions, Howe remarked, "tend to
weaken the authority of the Court," and being "entirely unknown in
Continental Europe . . . cannot be essential to the administration of
justice." 39
For all this, Louisiana's prohibition on dissent serves uneasily as an
example of the handiwork of either dissent's nationwide detractors or
their local allies. In spite of the interest outside Louisiana in the state's
31. Judge Carpenter, The Dissenting Opinion, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTEENTH ANNUAL
MEETING OF THE MICHIGAN STATE BAR ASSOCIATION 124 (1904).
32. Report of the Committee on Grievances, in REPORT OF THE FOURTEENTH ANNUAL MEETING
OF THE PENNSYLVANIA BAR ASSOCIATION 135, 140 (1908). The Pennsylvania Bar Association took
up the propriety of dissenting opinions, although only semi-seriously, after a member of the public
filed a grievance "to the effect that twelve jurymen are compelled to agree upon a verdict while the
judges of the appellate courts are not only allowed to dissent, but to record their reasons therefor." Id.
33. John F. Dillon, Law Reports and Law Reporting, in 9 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 257, 271, 273
(1886); see 9 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 9 (adopting the resolution).
34. Annual Report ofthe American Bar Association, in 21 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 437, 443 (1898).
35. W.T. Hutchins, A System of Judiciary for the New State, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST
ANNUAL MEETING OF THE OKLAHOMA AND INDIAN TERRITORY BAR ASSOCIATION 77, 84 (1904).
36. LA. CONST. OF 1898, art. 92.
37. Should Dissenting Opinions ofJudges Be Suppressed?, supra note 24, at 896.
38. Muzzling Dissenting Judges, WASH. POST, June 26, 1898, at 6.
39. William Wirt Howe, Address ofthe President, 21 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 235, 259 (1898).
2012] 513
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prohibition of dissenting opinions, no large number of the delegates at the
Constitutional Convention appears to have been self-consciously involved
in the national debate over judicial publication practices. 40 The local
newspapers did not discuss judicial opinion-writing practices in the period
leading up to the Convention, though one did hail the end of the "existing
abuse" after the Convention had ended and express its "hope that the
whole country will follow its [Louisiana's] example."41 A list of proposed
reforms to the judiciary published by the New Orleans Law Association
during the Convention made no reference to dissenting opinions.42
Records of the Convention's proceedings shed little light on the
prohibition's motivations. 4 3
Writing in 1963, Louisiana Supreme Court Justice Joe Sanders thought
the ban was "doubtless an economy measure," pointing to the fact that the
prohibition appeared in a provision of the constitution that also provided
that the position of official court reporter should be awarded to the lowest
bidder.44 Sanders also noted that "dissenting opinions continued to be
published in the Southern Reporter, a private publication,"4 5 which
provides considerable support for his interpretation of the prohibition's
motivations. Of course, Louisiana's judiciary is also shaped by its self-
40. The delegates hardly imagined themselves national innovators: one delegate reported back to
the Louisiana Bar Association that "[i]f I were asked to name the dominant and controlling
characteristic of the convention I should say it was conservatism." Thomas J. Keman, The
Constitutional Convention of 1898 and Its Work, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE LOUISIANA BAR
ASSOCIATION, 1898-1899, at 56 (1899). Reform of the judiciary was one of the Convention's goals,
Convention in Session, DAILY PICAYUNE, Feb. 9, 1898, at 8 (opening address of Convention president
Ernest Kruttschnitt). But as the same delegate reported back to the state bar association: "[Tihe
convention interpreted its mandate from the people to be, to disenfranchise as many negroes and as
few whites as possible, without violating the prohibition of the fifteenth amendment to the Federal
Constitution." Kernan, supra, at 57. The delegate also reported that "the publication [of law reports]
will be let to the lowest bidder, irrespective of residence, and the publication of concurring and
dissenting opinions is prohibited. It is thought that this will decrease both the dissent and the cost of
reports to the profession," id. at 64, but he did not appear to find this development worthy of further
comment.
41. See Should Dissenting Opinions of Judges Be Suppressed?, supra note 37 (quoting the New
Orleans Times-Democrat); Dissenting Opinions, TRENTON EVENING TIMES, supra note 24.
42. The Law Association: Annual Meeting in Which Lively Interest Is Taken, DAILY PICAYUNE,
Mar. 1, 1898, at 2.
43. The proceedings reveal only that the Committee on the Judiciary proposed the language
prohibiting dissenting opinions as part of its general recommendations to the Convention, which the
plenary Convention adopted in their entirety. See OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA: HELD IN NEW ORLEANS, TUES., FEB. 8,
1898 (1898).
44. Joe W. Sanders, The Role of Dissenting Opinions in Louisiana, 23 LA. L. REV. 673, 678
(1963); see also Keman, supra note 40 (citing reduced cost for lawyers purchasing reports as one
reason the convention prohibited dissenting opinions).
45. Id. Compare State v. Citizens' Bank of La., 27 So. 709 (La. 1899) (publishing two dissenting
opinions and one concurring opinion) with State v. Citizens' Bank of La., 52 La. Ann. 1086, 1103
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understanding as the inheritor of civil law traditions, although the
historical record contains no suggestion that this self-understanding was
related to the state's prohibition on dissent.4 6 Whatever motivated its
enactors, the constitutional prohibition on dissent was maintained when
Louisiana adopted another constitution in 1913,47 only to be removed
when Louisianans adopted yet another constitution in 192 1.48
Aside from Louisiana, no state actually banned dissenting opinions. At
least one bill prohibiting dissenting opinions was introduced into the New
York legislature, but little came of it.4 9 In sum, much ink was spilled
debating whether there was a need for a change in the practice of
publishing dissent, but efforts to effect change were meager and almost
uniformly unsuccessful. That this was so might suggest that the interest in
dissent was largely driven by editors seeking to engineer a controversy
that would sell magazines and by recently formed bar associations in
search of matters on which to write reports.
It is hard to say what else might have caused this sustained interest in
dissenting opinions. What statistical evidence there is does not indicate
any marked increase in the rate of dissent during the second half of the
nineteenth century.o Nor is there any sign that dissenting opinions
decreased in frequency after 1906, when the controversy over them died
46. Cf A.N. Yiannopoulos, Louisiana Civil Law: A Lost Cause?, 59 TUL. L. REV. 830, 833-36,
841-42 (1980) (suggesting that a self-conscious effort to preserve and cultivate Louisiana's civilian
traditions did not begin until the late 1930s). Louisiana had also long alternated between elective and
appointive methods of judicial selection; as a state, it had never had the professional, civil service
system of promotion to which the absence of dissent in Continental civilian systems is often
attributed. See BEN ROBERTSON MILLER, THE LOUISIANA JUDICIARY 7-84 (1932); Albert Tate, Jr.,
The Role of the Judge in Mixed Jurisdictions: The Louisiana Experience, 20 LOY. L. REV. 231, 233
(1974) ("The institutional origin of the Louisiana judge has common law rather than civil law roots
. . . . His opinions are not impersonal emanations of a judicial bureaucracy . . .
47. LA. CONST. OF l913, art. 92.
48. See LA. CONST. OF 1921. Accounts of the 1921 Constitutional Convention have little to say
on the lifting of the prohibition on dissent. See, e.g., Theodore G. Gronert, The Louisiana
Constitutional Conventions of 1913 and 1921, 4 SW. POL. & SOC. SC. Q. 301, 306-08 (1924)
(discussing judicial reform in Louisiana constitutional conventions without noting the change in the
provisions on dissenting opinions).
49. PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, TWENTIETH ANNUAL MEETING
79 (1897) (nothing that a bill "substantially prohibiting dissenting opinions in courts of final resort"
was introduced in the New York legislature in 1886); Current Topics, 33 ALB. L.J. 161, 161 (1886)
(mentioning the bill).
50. See Robert A. Kagan et al., The Business of State Supreme Courts, 1870-1970, 30 STAN. L.
REV. 121, 132 (1977); see also SIMEON EBEN BALDWIN, THE AMERICAN JUDICIARY 270 (1905)
(stating that in the latest volume of reports, there were dissents in fewer than twenty percent of cases
of the highest court of all but one state and that, in the aggregate, "out of nearly 5,000 cases decided a
dissent is stated in 284 only"); Unanimity of Judicial Opinion, in JUNE 1904 LAW NOTES 284-85
(same). In 1903, the Texas Bar Association thought it proper to hear a formal committee report on the
propriety of dissenting opinions in courts of last resort, even though, as the Committee noted, the
Texas Supreme Court filed hardly any dissents. See Ewing, supra note 27.
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off."' It is true that the court most in the nation's eye, the federal Supreme
Court, handed down a series of five-to-four decisions during this period,
with particularly scathing dissenting opinions. These dissents, particularly
those in the Income Tax Cases,52 the Northern Securities case, 3 and the
Insular Cases5 4 (described as "the climax of dissenting opinions"55)
contributed to the concern about the propriety of publishing dissents
generally. (Despite the canonical status they enjoy today, the dissenting
opinions in Plessy v. Ferguson5 6 and Lochner v. New York 57 appeared to
have barely registered on the consciousness of the legal profession and
played no part in the debate over dissenting opinions).5 ' But the Supreme
Court had previously decided controversial issues by one-vote majorities,
and had even done so over vigorous dissents, 59 without provoking a drive
to ban dissenting opinions. Furthermore, much, probably even most, of
the energies of anti-dissenters was directed at state judiciaries, not at the
federal Supreme Court.
Courts' burgeoning caseload certainly provided some motivation to
51. See Kagan, supra note 50, at 132; C. Herman Pritchett, Politics and Value Systems: The
Supreme Court, 1945-1946, 8 J. POL. 499, 504 (1946) (documenting a steady increase in the
frequency of dissenting opinions on the U.S. Supreme Court from 1910 to 1945).
52. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 652 (1895) (White, J., dissenting)
(intimating that the Court had "depart[ed] from the settled conclusions of its predecessors" and
determined the case "according to the mere opinion of those who temporarily fill its bench"); id. at
683 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Such a result is one to be deeply deplored. It cannot be regarded
otherwise than as a disaster to the country."); id. at 695 (Brown, J., dissenting) ("[T]he decision
involves nothing less than a surrender of the taxing power to the moneyed class."). These dissents
were widely published in the press, see, e.g., Justice Harlan's Dissent: He Is Very Emphatic in the
Expression of His Views, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1895, at 3, and if the enactment of the Sixteenth
Amendment is any indication, they were successful as appeals to the people.
53. Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
54. De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901);
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
55. Albert H. Putney, Five to Four Constitutional Law Decisions, 24 YALE L.J. 460, 465 (1915);
see also V.H. Roberts, Dissenting Opinions, 39 AM. L. REV. 23, 26 (1905) ("[T]he recent division of
the United States Supreme Court in the 'Northern Securities Case,' has to no small extent re-
awakened the old controversy respecting the value of dissenting opinions."); L.S. Rowe, The Supreme
Court and the Insular Cases, 18 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCi. 226, 226 (1904) ("[T]he series
of opinions [in the Insular Cases] brings up in acute form the question of the desirability of elaborate
dissenting opinions.").
56. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
57. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
58. Indeed, a 1917 article assessing Justice Harlan's dissenting opinions accorded Plessy only the
briefest of mentions, though it paid more attention to Lochner. See Thomas Jefferson Knight, The
Dissenting Opinions ofJustice Harlan, 51 AM. L. REv. 481, 500, 503-05 (1917).
59. See, e.g., Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 135 (1873) (Field, J., dissenting) (opining that
if courts uphold legislation such as that upheld by the majority "our government will be a republic
only in name"). The Supreme Court's sudden change of direction in the Income Tax Cases in the
1890s, see supra note 52 and accompanying text, was surpassed in abruptness by that in Hepburn and
Knox (the Legal Tender Cases) in the 1870s. See Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871);
Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870). The latter cases, however, did not spark a broad
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abolish dissent. 60 Not only were courts overworked, increased judicial
output had "overburdened [practitioners] with a constantly increasing load
of legal lore," causing some to hope that law reports could be shortened
by omitting the dissenting opinions. 61 But scarce space in law reports
hardly seems to have been the main concern of those opposed to dissent.62
Though they were quick to pen turgid editorials, the opponents of
dissent showed little interest in the kinds of specifics one would expect
from those genuinely committed to bringing about change: Was
disclosure of the fact of dissent to be prohibited or just publication of the
reasoning of the dissenting judge or judges? Should dissent in
intermediate appellate courts remain public? Should judges be prohibited
from expressing disagreement at all, or just within the pages of law
reports? What was to be done with concurring opinions? Only rarely did
the opponents of dissent descend to consider such details.
B. Abolishing Individual Authority: The Case Against Dissent
Difficult as it is to give an account of the controversy's causes, my
intent here is to examine the terms in which those who argued about
dissent reasoned about their disagreement. Roughly three arguments
implicating central judicial values were advanced against dissenting
opinions. First, as one might expect, many of the lawyers opposed to the
publication of dissent were concerned that dissenting opinions suggested
60. See ROSCOE POUND, ORGANIZATION OF COURTS 200 (1942); see also F.T. Hamlin, The New
York Constitutional Convention, 4 YALE L.J. 213, 217 (1895) (remarking that the New York judiciary
was "in an unfortunate condition .. . [having] broken down under the stress of the business it has been
called upon to do. [The Court of Appeals] had proved entirely inadequate to cope with its cases."). In
1871, the Albany Law Journal attributed the New York Court of Appeals' accomplishment in
deciding "thirty percent more cases than it otherwise could have heard and determined" in part to its
success in, as much as possible, "cut[ting] off that nuisance which has so long infested our court of
appeals reports-dissenting opinions." Current Topics, 3 ALB. L.J. 431, 432 (1871).
61. Frederick A. Teall, Dissenting Opinions, 67 ALB. L.J. 207, 208 (1905); see, e.g., Law
Reporting and Digesting, in 21 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 443 (1898) (considering, but not recommending, a
prohibition on dissenting opinions as one way "to retard the too rapid growth of the reports"); The
Deluge of Decisions: What Shall We Do to Be Saved?, 58 ALB. L.J. 219 (1898) (same); see also 46
CENT. L.J. 309, 309 (1898) (considering it "an important reason . .. for abolishing dissenting opinions
. . . that the main opinion would then come to be much shorter"); Edward G. Whitaker, Annual
Address as President of the N.Y. State Bar Association (Albany, Jan. 20, 1897), in PROCEEDINGS OF
THE N.Y. STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 49, at 63, 64 (noting that "the vast increase of court
law and judicial dicta is becoming a terrible burden by which justice itself is being oppressed" and
suggesting omission of dissenting opinions from law reports as a partial solution).
62. Some expressions of concern about the space in law reports were inflected by more profound
concerns about the nature of judicial authority. After asking "what good is accomplished by a
dissenting opinion? It is not an expression of the law, but of what is not the law," one writer went on
to vent his frustration with the forty-seven pages occupied by two dissents in Kean v. Calumet Canal
Improvement Co., 190 U.S. 452 (1903), railing, "Forty-seven pages of no law! Forty-seven pages in
disparagement of the law! for it is nothing else. Forty-seven pages to unsettle and discourage the
student of the law! Forty-seven pages of cogent argument to be hurled against courts by those who
already have too little respect for the law." Teall, supra note 61, at 207-08.
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that law was indeterminate. That concern was often coded, or poorly
articulated, as a concern that dissenting opinions "encourage[d]
litigation" 63 or detracted from "certainty in law."" Dissenting opinions, it
was said, might "puzzle the ordinary mind,"65 "unsettle and discourage
the student of the law," 66 and "bring judicial authority into contempt." 6 7 A
speaker at the Tennessee Bar Association was more forthright: after
expressing concern that "this constant dissenting and division has led the
public to believe that the law is a very uncertain and unsettled
arrangement," 68 he asserted that "[1]aw is a science, and not a guessing
contest," but then added that even "[i]f it be the latter, judges should not
spread the idea."69
But many of dissent's opponents framed their argument as relating not
to the nature of law, but instead to the nature of courts and the judicial
office. 70 Doing so, they welded two related arguments: they claimed that
63. See Reporting Dissenting Opinions, supra note 12.
64. See Current Topics, 33 ALB. L.J. 501, 502 (1886) ("[l]t is this . . . uncertainty of law,
traceable to dissenting opinions, that is one of the greatest mischiefs in judicial administration.").
65. Howe, supra note 39, at 259.
66. Teall, supra note 62, at 207; see Bartlett, supra note 16, at 55 (stating that dissenting opinions
tend "to bring unrest and doubt not only in the minds of the legal profession but among the public.");
From Bench and Bar, N.Y. TRIB., supra note 24 ("[T]hc dissenting opinion is at times fully as
conclusive to the ordinary mind as the opinion which expressed the sentiment of the majority of the
judges.").
67. Bartlett, supra note 16, at 57. One can only marvel at the suggestion that the dissenting
opinion in Dred Scott caused the Civil War. See Bowen, supra note 15, at 696; PROCEEDINGS OF THE
NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 49, at 79 (1897) (quoting George S. Batcheller as
suggesting that the dissenting opinions in Dred Scott "brought about a political, if not a sanguinary
revolution").
68. Ewing, supra note 27, at 117.
69. Id.
70. The Albany Law Journal, for instance, was sensitive to the charge that banishing dissent in
order to hide legal indeterminacy might seem profoundly undemocratic. But it suggested that such
criticism of its desire to prohibit dissent simply missed the mark, because, in its view, "[i]n five cases
out of six, the rule is just as good one way as the other; the virtue is in having a fixed rule." Current
Topics, supra note 19, at 261. The kinds of cases the Albany Law Journal had in mind-or at least a
great many of them-were not constitutional cases of political import. Indeed, constitutional cases
were sometimes even excepted from the controversy. See, e.g., Samuel C. Graham, Some Philosophy
of the Law and Lawyers, in REPORT OF THE FIFTEENTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE VIRGINIA STATE
BAR ASSOCIATION 197 (Eugene C. Massie ed., 1903) (noting disagreement about the publication of
dissent but stating that "[a]ll ... agree that if great constitutional and political questions, which have
provoked differences of opinion between people and parties, must at last be settled by a divided court,
that the world should know the reasons which impelled the opinions."). Moreover, opponents of
dissent were particularly fixated on publication in official law reports and expressed no, or fewer,
reservations about the dissemination of dissenting views to the public through unofficial reporters or
law journals. See infra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
This is not to say that some opponents of judicial dissent were uninterested in promoting what we
might today call a juricentric vision of the Constitution, in which judicial pronouncements on the
meaning of the Constitution should be authoritative and final and that dissenting opinions, as "appeals
to the people," were a threat to judicial supremacy and the rule of law. See, e.g., Wollman, supra note
17, at 49 ("The result of a dissenting opinion is simply to open up for future discussion . . . and
bickering the question which should then be finally settled by that tribunal . .. when once it settles it,
it should be settled forever."); cf Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from
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appellate courts were primarily composite units, not collections of judges
and also that dissenting opinions amounted to no more than personal
statements by the judge as an individual which, as such, were not
deserving of publication in law reports. Thus, many opponents of dissent
expressed their concern not as being that the public might come to know
that judges sometimes disagree as to what the law is, but instead that the
publication of dissenting opinions in law reports violated norms of
professional role differentiation that implicated the nature of courts' self-
presentation as institutions. Courts should be impersonal, composite units,
they argued, so the personal views of judges deserved no place in law
reports.
Such reasoning was in evidence as early as 1870, when the Albany Law
Journal expressed its view that courts should write opinions as if they
were composite institutions, not collections of individuals, or in its
colorful phrase, "several courts of one judge each."" The Albany Law
Journal deployed this corporate notion of courts against the publication of
dissenting opinions and indeed, against even the acknowledgment of
dissent among the members of a court. A court, like the decisions it
issues, "is theoretically a unit," it explained, "and there is no theoretical or
practical good in disclosing the fact that in a particular case it is made up
of discordant fractions." 72
To promote such a corporate notion of the appellate court, the Albany
Law Journal insisted that, in law reports, judges should speak in what it
constructed as their only official capacity, that of pronouncing the law on
behalf of the court. The Albany Law Journal dismissed the notion that
"judges have a right to not to appear to accede to propositions from which
they really dissented."73 "[W]rongful suspicion" of holding the views of
the court's majority, even where one did not agree with them, the Albany
Law Journal wrote, "may be one of the penalties of the position. It is no
part of the business of a judge to apologize for his own opinion or to
censure the opinion of the majority of his brethren. . . . It seems quite
certain that so far as judges themselves are concerned therefore, it is better
on many accounts that their personal views should not be disclosed."74
The Albany Law Journal suggested that it would be preferable for
judges to express dissent in their capacity as private citizens by publishing
the People: Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1, 17 (2003) (defining
juricentrism as the "notion that courts have the exclusive prerogative to declare constitutional
meaning"). But, again, the debate over dissenting opinions did not fixate on constitutional cases.
71. Courts and Decisions, I ALB. L.J. 405, 405 (1870).
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dissenting opinions as articles in law reviews. The Daily Register had
proposed that judges publish dissenting opinions in the popular press so
that:
[t]he judgement of the court is embodied in the reports as an
authoritative declaration of the law of the land, qualified only by
the indication that 'Justice S.' dissented and the dissent would be
spread abroad in the public journals in an ephemeral form, where
it would reach the public more freely, and the views of the
dissenting judge would have an opportunity to win their way in
public approval and react on public opinion, not authoritatively,
nor by way of impugning the authority of the decision, but as
forming part of the great body of that general judgment on affairs
of public concern by which judges, like all other officers, must,
and ought to be, in a proper degree, influenced; and especially
would have a better opportunity to influence legislation.75
Though it responded to this proposal with some skepticism, the Albany
Law Journal conceded that the publication of dissenting opinions in the
popular press was "less to be deprecated . . . than the publication of
dissenting opinions in the reports." 76 The New Orleans Times Democrat, a
supporter of its home state's constitutional prohibition on dissenting
opinions, likewise thought that "[i]f dissenting judges desire to controvert
the opinions of their brethren of the majority they should do it in the
pages of law journals instead of forcing them upon the public through the
medium of the reports."7 7 These proposals suggest that a desire to hide
legal indeterminacy or to exclude the public from the generation of legal
meaning was not the central concern of at least some advocates of a
prohibition on dissent. According to their logic, a judge might express his
dissentient, personal views when writing as a citizen for publication in a
magazine, just not when writing in his capacity of judge for the law
reports.
When the debate over dissent reached its apex around the turn of the
century, this institutional objection to dissent-that is, that because a
court is a composite institution and a dissenting opinion is nothing more
than a statement by a judge as an individual, only majority opinions
should be published in law reports-became a central argument against
the publication of dissent. An 1898 article in the American Lawyer
contended that "dissenting opinions can have but one purpose, and that is
75. Dissenting Magazine Articles, 18 AM. L. REV. 468, 468 (1884) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The Daily Register's understanding of the role of dissenting opinions is remarkably similar
to that of contemporary popular constitutionalists such as Lani Guinier. See generally Lani Guinier,
Demosprudence Through Dissent, 122 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2008).
76. Dissenting Magazine Articles, supra note 75, at 468 (internal quotation marks omitted).
77. See Dissenting Opinions, TRENTON EVENING TIMES, supra note 24.
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to give a judge an opportunity of exhibiting his individual views and
opinions."" But, its author continued, "the decision should be that of the
court, and not of the judges as individuals . . . . The decision rendered
should not reflect the opinion of this judge or that judge but should be the
opinion of the court." 9 C.A. Hereschoff Bartlett, writing in the Law
Magazine and Review, was even more forceful in promoting the notion
that appellate courts were units and that dissents were mere statements by
individuals: "The names of individual judges who concur or dissent
should be obliterated from the reports. What the legal profession wants
are the judgments of its Courts as a united body and not the opinions of
individual judges."so He continued: "Judgements of the highest Courts
should be their judgement pure and simple, in which all individuality of
members of the Court disappears and is absorbed in the united opinion of
the Court pronounced by the judge who renders it."" t A 1905 article in the
Green Bag concurred in Bartlett's assertion that "individuality" in law
reporting was noxious: "Of the many injurious aspects of the Dissenting
Opinion, one of the most destructive is that by emphasizing the personal
composition of courts, it is subversive of their great anonymous
authority." 82 A court is a "different entity from an aggregation of . . .
distinguished lawyers;"83 the danger of a dissenting opinion, its author
proclaimed, was that it "destroys [a court's] impersonality" and thereby
"destroys the authority by which alone [a court] lives."84
These appeals to impersonality were more than appeals to unanimity.
Often it was unclear if those appealing to the "anonymous" or
"impersonal" authority of courts also opposed the appearance of the
names of the authors of majority opinions in law reports. But some, such
as the commentators of the Central Law Journal, understood their
opposition to dissenting opinions to imply that all judicial opinions should
be pronounced per curiam.8 These views were shared by George
78. Wollman, supra note 17, at 49.
79. Id.
80. Bartlett, supra note 16, at 55.
81. Id. In a similar vein, the editors of The Bar opined:
[Tlhe most pernicious effect [of dissenting opinions], in our view, is that of individualizing
the members of a tribunal which under the theory of our government is an integral body, in
which the individual members are merged into a unit constituting a distinct department.
When the majority promulgates an opinion it is the judgement of the court, and not of the
individual members of the Court and it ought to carry with it all the force and dignity, as it
does in effect, carry the full authority of a department of the government.
Dissenting Opinions, 12 THE BAR 7-8 (1905).
82. See Bowen, supra note 15, at 696.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See Jetsam and Flotsam, 46 CENT. L.J. 309, 309 (1898).
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Batcheller, who introduced a bill in the New York legislature to
"substantially prohibit" dissent at the Court of Appeals. He too explained
that if a court ceased to publish dissenting opinions and if judges stopped
signing their names to majority opinions, there would be "no personality
in the decisions of the court [which would] give[] greater stability to the
decisions of the tribunal."86
Impersonality, then, at times subsumed anonymity, but at other times it
meant even more than just anonymity. One of the more widely published
articles objected to dissent on the grounds that "[i]t is well known that the
courts of least dignity, as the justices' courts, are those in which the
personality of the judge is the most striking feature." 87 In such usage,
"personality" cannot mean only unanimity or even just anonymity, but
instead implicates the extent to which a legal decision seems the product
of abstract, impersonal norms, and not the product of a concrete
individual's personal views of the justice of the case.
Thus, to promote the notion of the appellate court as a composite unit,
which made decisions on the basis of determinate, impersonal norms,
opponents of dissent constructed the judicial role as involving only the
announcement of the law and insisted that law reports contain only the
statements of judges speaking in this official role. And, as I will now
explore, just as those opposing dissenting constructed dissenting opinions
as mere personal statements by the judge as an individual, many of those
who defended or valorized dissenting opinions understood them as
expressions of a judge's virtuous character and integrity of personal
conscience.
C. In Defense ofDissent: Publicity and Personality
A significant number of lawyers and legal periodicals rallied to the
defense of dissenting opinions. They wielded a number of arguments.
They asserted that democratic notions of publicity required the
publication of dissenting opinions; they also directly opposed the notion
that courts are composite institutions, appealing to a different vision of
judicial authority, according to which courts were public collections of
individual judges. Simultaneously, as I shall explore, a literature
developed that celebrated dissenting opinions as the expressions of a
judge's moral virtue and rectitude of character.
Some defenders of dissenting opinions understood the argument to be
86. PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 49, at 79 (1897).
87. Bowen, supra note 15, at 696; cf MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
ORGANIZATION 336 (Talcott Parsons cd., A.M. Henderson & Talcot Parsons trans., 1947) (referring
to the "still quite patriarchal, summary and highly irrational jurisdiction of the justices of the peace.").
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about the nature of law. As the Harvard Law Review summarized:
[M]any advocates of dissenting opinions are willing to have the
law temporarily unsettled by a cogent dissent, since they do not
admit the total undesirability of such a condition. So long as courts
are permitted to reverse their own decisions, the law will never be
definitely fixed. Moreover, as the law is not composed of
unrelated rules, it will always be found that parts out of harmony
with the whole will require alteration to avoid contradictions.8 8
But arguments related to the nature of law were never distant from
arguments about the nature of courts. Writing in the Yale Law Journal,
Justice Emlin McLain of the Iowa Supreme Court argued that "[o]ne of
the most significant features of our entire judicial system is the publicity
with which every stage in the proceeding is attended. To suppress
[dissenting opinions] would probably lead to the disquieting belief that
the real uncertainties of litigation are much more numerous and
dangerous" than they actually are.89 The American Law Review argued
that dissenting opinions distinguished judging "from a mere arbitrary
exercise of power" and that their publication was required by the
"fundamental principle of Anglo-American law that the courts of justice
shall be open."90 Courts, it argued, should not pretend to "the infallibility
which has been ascribed to an acumenical council of the Church of
Rome."9 1 An article in the Nebraska State Journal equated dissenting
opinions with democratic publicity in particularly forceful terms, claiming
that "the dissenting opinions of judges of our courts ... start the lifeblood
of advancement of human liberty and free government coursing through
the body politic," and concluding that "[w]e need more of them."92
88. See Dissenting Opinions, HARV. L. REV., supra note 23, at 309. Professor V.H. Roberts
defended dissenting opinions in a widely published article on the grounds that "the well considered
opinion of the dissenting judge is often the clarion voice of a whole people lifted in protest against
laws which have become obsolete or unjust." V.H. Roberts, supra note 55, at 26; see S.F. DAILY
EVENING BULL., Apr. 4, 1890, supra note 24 ("The law is uncertain and will ever remain so in some
measure until the constitution of human nature is changed, and the frequency of dissenting opinions
should and does indicate that the vitality and shifting life of the people are not fitted to a bed of
Procrustes, and that people are not in their life and business compelled to follow the dead letter ...
."); see also Publication of Dissenting Opinions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1886, at 4 (arguing that
dissents may be useful for courts in other states and that to stop their publication "would be to check
the progress of adjudication towards absolute soundness").
89. See McLain, supra note 24, at 192.
90. Dissenting Opinions, 20 AM L. REV. 428, 429(1886).
91. Id.; see Should Dissenting Opinions ofJudges Be Suppressed?, supra note 24 (arguing that "a
movement for the suppression of dissenting opinions is a movement for the suppression of judicial
argument; a movement for the suppression of light and truth," and that "what is wanted in the
administration ofjustice is plain truth, openness and publicity").
92. Repugnant in Practice, NEB. ST. J., Jan. 13, 1898, at 2. The association of "American
democracy" with dissenting opinions appears to have been strong enough that American occupying
forces, engaged in one of the nation's periodic attempts to export democracy, ordered that Puerto
Rican and Cuban courts publish dissenting opinions. See General Orders No. 118, Headquarters
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The American Law Review directly countered the contention by
opponents of dissent that courts were corporate units, insisting instead that
courts should write opinions as if they were, in fact, collections of
individual judges. If it could have had its way, it would have returned to a
system of seriatim opinions: it urged that "each judge should study the
record separately and state his opinion publicly. This would be in some
respects an ideal administration of justice."93 The American Law Review
was attracted to this traditional vision of courts at least in part because it
desired the ability to identify judicial opinions as the products of concrete
individuals. The American Law Review professed its failure to understand
why some "opinions are delivered per curiam instead of being fathered by
the particular judge who writes the opinion."9 4 A popular manual entitled
The Study of Cases, which defended dissenting opinions, likewise
declared that "if the opinion of the court is rendered anonymously, that is
to say, per curiam it does not receive as high respect as an opinion
vouched for by some one judge and adopted by the court.""
In contrast to the criticism of dissent as an expression of private
idiosyncrasy, a literature developed celebrating dissenting opinions as
expressions of a judge's virtuous character. One author praised Justice
Peter Daniel's dissenting opinions because they "exhibit patience,
industry and profound research, and while they are not always fair and
temperate in language, there is no doubt that they represent the
Department of Porto Rico, Aug. 16, 1899, at 65, reprinted in LAWS, ORDINANCES, DECREES, AND
MILITARY ORDERS HAVING THE FORCE OF LAW IN PORTO RICO, MAY 1, 1900, at 610, 614 (1909);
Military Order No. 63, Headquarters Division of Cuba, Adna R. Chaffee, May 25, 1899, reprinted in
CIVIL REPORT OF MAYOR-GENERAL JOHN R. BROOKE 42 (1900).
93. Curbing the Law Reports, 37 AM. L. REV. 923, 924 (1903). J.H. Baker has called attention to
how late nineteenth-century legal reforms in England culminated a long transformation in the
conception of a court from what he calls "court as meeting" to "court as institution." See J.H. BAKER,
The Changing Concept ofa Court, in THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND THE COMMON LAW: HISTORICAL
ESSAYS 153 (1986). The turn-of-the-century American disagreement over the nature of a court may
well have been one of the episodes in the much longer evolution of the cultural and professional
understandings of that institution, which Baker describes. At the beginning of the century, in some
states the very institution of an appellate court of last resort, composed of professional judges, was an
innovation. Georgia serves as an extreme example: not only was there no appellate court until 1845,
but judges were even chastised by a resolution of the legislature for "illegally assembling themselves
together" to discuss legal questions. Bond Almand, The Supreme Court of Georgia, 6 GA. BUS. J. 95,
96, 105 (1943) (quoting the resolution). In other states, such as New York, the final appeal was to a
body not easily recognizable as a court: until 1846, final appeal in New York was had to a body
composed of the New York State Senate, the Lieutenant Governor, Supreme Court judges, and the
Chancellor of Equity. N.Y. CONST. art. XXXIII (1777); N.Y. CONST. art. V, § 1(1821). It, and other
"absurdities," were abolished by the 1846 Constitution. ALDEN CHESTER, COURTS AND LAWYERS OF
NEW YORK 793 (1925). Such courts of last resort would be difficult to conceive-to borrow the words
of one editorial opposing dissent-as "an integral body, in which the individual members are merged
into a unit constituting a distinct department." Dissenting Opinions, THE BAR, supra note 81, at 7.
94. Per Curiam Opinions, 25 AM. L. REv. 611,611 (1891).
95. EUGENE WAMBAUGH, THE STUDY OF CASES: A COURSE OF INSTRUCTION IN READING AND
STATING REPORTED CASES § 45 (2d ed. 1894); see id. at § 47 (acknowledging that "there is in some
quarters opposition to publishing dissenting opinions," yet defending their publication).
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conscientious views of the writer, and were dictated solely by what he
believed to be the justice of the case." 96 The same author concluded: "One
cannot fail to admire the pluck of the stout old Virginia gentleman, who
for nineteen years fought single-handed for his convictions . . . . As an
example of moral courage, the career of Mr. Justice Daniel has few, if
any, parallels in the judicial history of the country."97 In an article that
was reprinted in a number of journals, Hampton Carson, then attorney
general of Pennsylvania, depicted "a dissenting judge [as] the leader of a
forlorn hope [or] the champion of a lost cause," whose "independence of
view . . . boldly asserted itself in spite of the pressure of the majority."
Another article of the time extolled great dissenting judges as
"independent thinkers [who] gave their dissenting opinions because they
have found them the only means of preserving their independence of
thought and perfect honesty of character." 99 Dissenting opinions, yet
another author wrote, "faithfully indicate the searching investigation of
fearless and independent jurists into the law and the facts." 00
Such valorization of "great dissenting opinions" is consistent with the
nineteenth-century constructions of the judicial office and judicial
authority that have been explored by a number of historians. Most of the
debate over dissenting opinions occurred within bar associations and on
the pages of publications catering to lawyers.' 0 ' In the words of Stephen
Botein, "[J]udgeship . . . was an essential ingredient in the symbolic
language of the American legal profession. Prominent lawyers . . . defined
and extolled judicial office in such a way as to promote a general image
of themselves as a kind of 'traditional' intelligentsia."102 Many in the legal
profession were anxious about the perceived decline of lawyers from their
status as members of an elite intelligentsia into the sordid servants of
cutthroat capitalism, or perhaps worse, into ordinary, tedious
businessmen. 10 3 Defense of the majestic figure of the individual judge
96. H.B. Brown, The Dissenting Opinions of Mr. Justice Daniel, 21 AM. L. REV. 869, 870
(1887).
97. Id. at 900.
98. Hampton L. Carson, Great Dissenting Opinions, in REPORT OF THE SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL
PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 273, 274 (1894).
99. Dissenting Opinions, 54 AM. L. REV. 63, 64 (1906).
100. The Value ofJudicial Dissent, supra note 24.
101. But for examples of interest in the debate over dissenting opinions by the lay press, see
sources cited supra note 24.
102. Stephen Botein, "hat We Shall Meet Afterwards in Heaven": Judgeship as a Symbol for
Modern American Lawyers, in PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA 47, 50
(Gerald L. Gelson ed., 1983).
103. RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 154-63 (1955); see also Robert Gordon, "The
Ideal and the Actual in the Law ": Fantasies and Practices of New York City Lawyers, 1870-1910, in
NEW HIGH PRIESTS, supra, at 51, 62; John Matzko, "The Best Men of the Bar": The Founding of the
American Bar Association, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA 78
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beholden only to the law and justice emphasized the Bar's camaraderie
with such figures of the bench and may have helped lawyers overlook the
increasing affinity of their profession to a business like any other. Appeals
by the opponents of dissents to institutional impersonality, similar to that
of Continental European judiciaries,1 0 4 suggests that another vision of
judicial authority stood in some tension, if perhaps not outright
contradiction, with the idealization of the individual hero-judge
chronicled by historians. Many lawyers argued that appellate courts
should write opinions as if they were impersonal institutions, not
collections of heroic, individual judges. As I will now explore, that
view-that of dissent's opponents-stands in stark contrast to lawyers'
understanding of the ideal form of judicial authority towards the end of
the twentieth century.
II. THE "BUREAUCRATIZATION OF THE JUDICIARY" IN THE LATE
TWENTIETH CENTURY
In the final two decades of the twentieth century, a significant number
of lawyers came to express concern about what they called the
(Gerard W. Gawalt ed., 1984). For an example of such anxiety, see John F. Dillon, The True
Professional Ideal, in REPORT OF SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION 409, 410 (1894). Dillon describes an ideal lawyer "who by unwearied industries
masters the vast and technical learning and details of his profession, but who, not satisfied with this,
studies the eternal principles of justice [and views a court as] a temple where faith, truth, honor and
justice abide and he one of its ministers." Given this ideal, Dillon was distressed by the tendency "in
our modern life ... to assimilate the practice of law to the conduct of commercial business." Id.
Worship of the judge as a moral hero had a long tradition among lawyers, and many late
nineteenth-century lawyers were appealing to this traditional notion of the judge. Consider, for
example, Timothy Walker's 1837 paean to the judge as a superhuman moral hero, at the "topmost
round of the [legal] ladder":
[H]ere [i.e., in the judge] all the high qualities of [the lawyer's] nature are called into
exercise. The sagacity which cannot be misled by sophistry; the integrity which nothing can
shake or bribe; the stem impartiality, which forgets the party and looks only at the cause; the
dignified courtesy, which rebukes levity while it wins respect: these are the qualities,
without which all the learning of a Coke would not make a worthy judge; and which no
where shine so conspicuously as from the bench.
Timothy Walker, INTRODUCTORY LECTURE ON THE DIGNITY OF THE LAW AS A PROFESSION:
DELIVERED AT THE CINCINNATI COLLEGE, ON THE FOURTH OF NOVEMBER, 1837 (Gale, Making of
Modem Law 2009) (1837); see also Susanna Blumenthal, Law and the Creative Mind, 74 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 151 (1998) (describing the long tradition ofjudicial hagiography among American lawyers).
104. There is no clear indication that the opponents of dissenting opinions were motivated by a
desire to imitate Continental European institutions, although there was a certainly an awareness of the
Continental example. See, e.g., Howe, supra note 39, at 259. The frequent reference by those
defending dissent to the "Anglo-American" system of justice, of which dissenting opinions were
supposedly an essential part, might also be interpreted as an implicit distinction from more statist
Continental judiciaries. See, e.g., Dissenting Opinions, 20 AM L. REV., supra note 90, at 429. The
author of one of the more widely published polemics against the dissenting opinions, C.A. Hereschoff
Bartlett, also took great interest in the French judiciary. See C.A. Hereschoff Bartlett, The French
Judicial System, 38 L. MAG. & REV. 257 (1913).
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"bureaucratization" of the judiciary.'0o These lawyers worried, in the
words of one of their number, that the expansion of judicial support staff
from law clerks to magistrate judges had "subtly alter[ed] . . . the
'personal' character of the judicial office.""o6 Now members of the legal
profession almost uniformly expressed the view that the "personal"
quality of judging was central to judicial legitimacy.'o7 Even those
skeptical about the extent to which the judiciary had actually been
"bureaucratized" affirmed the importance of "maintaining a personalized
judiciary" that employed the "personalized decision-making that is the
historic strength of our judiciary."'"8
By opposing corporate, institutional anonymity to personality or
individuality and finding the distinction to be essential to judicial
legitimacy, these lawyers reasoned about judicial legitimacy in terms
strikingly similar to those used in the debate about dissenting opinions
around the century's beginning. To be sure, there were differences.
Lawyers at the end of the century were primarily concerned not about
judicial self-presentation, but instead about the way in which judicial
decisions were actually made; they worried that judicial staffs, rather than
judges themselves, had assumed much of the judicial function. But when
they sought to explain why the delegation of the judicial task to
subordinates, but not the delegation of the task of other government
officials,0 9 created grave concerns about legitimacy, they argued that the
105. See, e.g., ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 4 (1993); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 102-19
(1985); see also Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of
Article III, 113 HARV. L. REv. 924, 951-54 (2000) (providing a historical overview of the expansion
of the federal judiciary's institutional capacities and the diffusion of adjudicatory authority away from
Article III judges); cf WOLF V. HEYDEBRAND & CARROLL SERON, RATIONALIZING JUSTICE 134
(1990) (describing "at least four separate ways in which the notion[] of bureaucracy ... [is] used in
discussions of the .. . courts").
106. Wade H. McCree, Jr., Bureaucratic Justice: An Early Warning, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 777, 791
(1981).
107. See Owen Fiss, The Bureaucratization of the Judiciary, 92 YALE L.J. 1442, 1443 (1983)
("[B]ureaucratization tends to corrode the individualistic processes that are the source of judicial
legitimacy."); Patrick E. Higginbotham, Bureaucracy: The Carcinoma of the Federal Judiciary, 31
ALA. L. REV. 261, 265 (1980) ("[T]he judicial task is nondelegable. Central to it is the judge, who
must make the decision."); Alvin Rubin, Bureaucratization of Federal Courts: The Tension Between
Justice and Efficiency, 55 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 648, 654 (1980) (expressing concern about "the
conversion of federal judges from individual decision-makers to spokesmen for a faceless
bureaucracy"); Joseph Vining, Justice, Bureaucracy and Legal Method, 80 MICH. L. REV. 248, 251
(1981) (observing with dismay that the Supreme Court is "no longer nine judges in dialogue with one
another").
108. Patricia M. Wald, The Problem with the Courts: Black-Robed Bureaucracy or Collegiality
Under Challenge?, 42 MD. L. REv. 766, 769 (1983).
109. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 107, at 1443 ("[l1n the context of the judiciary, bureaucratization
poses a unique challenge to the legitimacy of government power."). After all, nothing is more natural
than for the statutory responsibilities of, for instance, the Attorney General to be carried out by his or
her subordinates. Cf 28 U.S.C. § 510 ("The Attorney General may from time to time make such
provisions as he considers appropriate authorizing the performance by any other officer, employee, or
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ability to detect a concrete, identifiable individual behind judicial
decisionmaking, one with a sense of conscience, personal character, and
emotional experience, was essential to judicial legitimacy.
Owen Fiss posited that "we" only accept judicial power if there lies
individual, personal responsibility behind decisions: "By signing his name
to a judgment or opinion, the judge assures the parties that he [has
listened to all parties affected] and assumes individual responsibility for
the decision."' 10 "Bureaucratization," for Fiss, "raise[d] the spectre that
the judge's signature is but a sham.""' Patricia Wald reasoned that "to
preserve and to reinforce public confidence" in courts, judges must render
impartial decisions "while preserving the values of the judge's own
personal reasoning, experience, and ultimately, sense of responsibility." 1 2
In a perceptive formulation, she diagnosed the "fear of failing to . . .
maintain[] a personalized judiciary that applies impersonalized rules" as
being "at the heart of the alarms that have been sounded about judicial
bureaucratization.""' Joseph Vining explained that judicial opinions
"exert their authority over us and command our respect and serious
attention only to the extent that we hear a person speaking through
them."ll 4 He worried about the rise of "bureaucratic writing," that is,
"opinions ... [that] seem things written by no one at all.""5 Other writers
similarly expressed their concern about bureaucratization as being that it
threatened to deprive judicial decisionmaking of its personal character.11 6
The twentieth-century opponents of judicial bureaucratization were
deeply influenced by a Weberian theory of modernization and some
announced that their project was, in part, a struggle against some of that
theory's implications. Vining attributed his reverence of courts to their
status as one of "the last of the great voices to be rationalized,""' while
Anthony Kronman, one of the most important contemporary interpreters
of Max Weber, devoted attention to judicial bureaucratization largely as
an extension of his campaign against the "disenchantment of the world""'
and the "flatten[ing] . . . process of rationalization . . . that has
undermined the basis of every traditionalist claim to authority.""19
agency of the Department of Justice of any function of the Attorney General.").
110. Fiss, supra note 107, at 1458.
111. Id.
112. Wald, supra note 108, at 769.
113. Id.
114. JOSEPH VINING, THE AUTHORITATIVE AND THE AUTHORITARIAN 14 (1986).
115. Vining, supra note 107, at 251.
116. See sources cited supra note 107.
117. See VINING, supra 114, at 19.
118. See, e.g., Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE. L.J. 1029, 1046 (1990).
119. Id.; see KRONMAN, supra note 105, at 315-20.
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In Weber's highly stylized, ideal-typical account, the appearance and
increasing importance of the distinction between the personal and the
official is one of the hallmarks of legal and organizational modernization.
Weber characterized modern societies as increasingly dominated by
rational-legal bureaucratic authority, what he called a "spirit of formalistic
impersonality,"1 20 while he described both traditional and charismatic
authority as "personal." 121 For Weber, rational-legal authority was
"impersonal" because in a bureaucracy, authority was owed to the office,
not its incumbent,12 2 and there exists "complete separation of the property
belonging to the organization, which is controlled within the sphere of
office, and the personal property of the official, which is available for his
own private use." 2 3 In other words, for Weber, modernization was largely
a story of role-differentiation in which authority figures come to wield
power not because of who they intrinsically are as individuals but because
of the official roles they assume.124  Traits of character, individual
conscience, bonds of friendship, and personal loyalty-much of what has
been described as "m[a]n as a concrete psycho-organic unit"' 2 5-fall on
the side of the private or personal and so, in Weber's view, are separated
from the modern official's exercise of power.126 Correspondingly, the
120. Id. at 340.
121. WEBER, supra note 87, at 336 (describing traditional authority and charismatic authority as
resting "upon personal authority"); id at 328 ("In the case of traditional authority, obedience is owed
to the person of the chief" (emphasis added)); id. at 341 ("[Tlhe object of obedience is the personal
authority of the individual which he enjoys by virtue of his traditional status . . . ." (emphasis added));
id. at 328 (arguing that charismatic authority "rest[sl on devotion to the specific and exceptional
sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person"); id. at 363-64 (arguing that, in the
"pure form of charismatic authority ... the social relations involved are strictly personal, based on the
validity of charismatic personal qualities").
122. Id. at 328 ("[O]bedience is owed to the legally established impersonal order. It extends to
the persons exercising the authority of office under it only by virtue of the formal legality of their
commands and only within the scope of authority of the office.").
123. Id. at 331; see also id. at 333-34. The relation between these two aspects of the division
between the personal and the official is not obvious, but, presumably, both aspects of role-
differentiation permit increased centralization and efficiency. Cf NIKLAS LUHMANN, THE
DIFFERENTIATION OF SOCIETY 45 (Stephen Holmes trans., 1982) (suggesting that "the essential
characteristics of Weber's model of bureaucracy, the separation between the workplace and the
family, between business and personal property [and its] impersonal orientation[,] can be formulated
in the following single proposition: They free the system from a concern with the motivational
structure of its members.").
124. Writing in a Weberian tradition, Niklas Luhmann insists that modem societies "exclud[e]
men as concrete psycho-organic units," and that "socio-cultural evolution" can be "define[d] ... by
reference to the increasing separation or differentiation between interaction systems." LUHMANN,
supra note 123, at xx, 77. In each "interaction system," individuals assume different roles, none of
which fully subsumes him or her as a "concrete psycho-organic unit[]." Id. at xx; see also infra note
160 and accompanying text.
125. LUHMANN, supra note 123, at xx.
126. Cf Lloyd I. Rudolph & Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, Authority and Power in Bureaucratic
Administration: A Revisionist Interpretation of Weber on Bureaucracy, 31 WORLD POL. 195, 204-05
(1979) (noting the difficulties in Weber's use of the distinction between personal and official
authority to describe modernization, especially the failure of his ideal-typical model to acknowledge
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modem official is expected more sharply to differentiate between when he
or she is acting as a private individual and when he or she is acting in an
official capacity.
Influenced as they were by a Weberian theory of modernization, those
who bemoaned the bureaucratization of the judiciary often framed their
complaint in terms of the manner in which the distinction between the
official and the personal organized the judicial role in the late twentieth
century. Fiss, who disavowed concern about bureaucratization in Weber's
sense of the term,' 27 nonetheless reasoned that "we insist that each
judge-as an individual and as an official-accept full responsibility for
his decisions by signing his opinion and disclosing his vote."128 Fiss
worried that in a bureaucratized judiciary, judges no longer assumed
personal, individual responsibility for their decisions. Vining worried that
the increased size of judicial staffs had led to the loss of an "intimate"
relationship between judge and clerk, evoking notions of .affect usually
associated with the private and personal.129 Kronman worried that
bureaucratization had caused a "depreciation of the lawyer-statesmen
ideal" in the courts,13 0 an ideal he identified with the nineteenth-century
bar's "hero figures"'"' who distinguished themselves by their "qualities of
character." 3 2 In sum, though their precise concerns were varied, these
authors shared a belief that bureaucratization threatened to remove from
judging the traits of character, emotional experience or conscience
frequently associated with the private or personal, but which were, in their
view, necessary to judicial legitimacy. They resisted the notion that
judges might act merely as officials, and yearned for judicial decisions to
be and seem the products of a fully integrated person, one acting both in
an individual and in an official capacity.
This desire stands in contrast to the role differentiation demanded of
judges by those who advocated that dissent be prohibited and that "all
individuality of members of the Court disappear and [be] absorbed in the
united opinion of the Court."l 33 Unlike Fiss, who wanted to see in the
judge's signature an indication that he or she had engaged with a case as a
matter of personal conscience, opponents of dissent insisted that judges'
expressions in law reports contain a thinner, less authentic expression of
the importance of affect and honor in bureaucratic administration).
127. Fiss, supra note 107, at 1452 (stating that "the Weberian model does not fit the American
judiciary").
128. Id. (emphasis added).
129. See Vining, supra note 107, at 251.
130. KRONMAN, supra note 105, at 320.
131. Id. at 12.
132. Id. at 16.
133. Bartlett, supra note 16, at 55.
530 [Vol. 24:507
24
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 24, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol24/iss2/2
Smith
their personal selves as it was "one of the penalties of the position," at
times, to "appear to accede to propositions from which [a judge] really
dissented."l 3 4
III. DISSENTING OPINIONS AND PERSONAL AUTHORITY
As I explored in Part I, many of the turn-of-the-century lawyers
celebrating or criticizing dissent agreed that dissenting opinions were
personal statements of a judge as an individual, not statements of an
official, and they discussed the value of publishing dissenting opinions in
terms of whether such statements deserved publication in law reports. As
shown by these lawyers' construction of a dissenting opinion as merely a
statement by an individual, their desire for anonymous, per curiam
opinions, their association of "personality" with justices of the peace,'
and by the literature valorizing dissenting opinions as an expression of a
judge's inner nature and moral character, for many of those involved in
the debate, "personality" meant the ability to detect a concrete individual
behind a judicial decision. To put the controversy in Weberian terms,
many turn-of-the-century lawyers disagreed about whether the publication
of judges' personal views violated the norms of role-differentiation that
applied to them as modem officials.
But, as I briefly explore in this Part, a dissenting opinion of course need
not be understood as merely a private statement by an individual. If, for a
dissent to be more than a private statement by an individual, it must
further some institutional goal of the judiciary, there are a number of ways
in which a dissent may be understood as furthering such goals. Moreover,
by the time bureaucratization came to occupy a central place in the
discussions of the judiciary, concern with fractured majority opinions had
largely spilled over into a disdain for dissent. Thus, the very lawyers who
championed the personal character of the judicial role did not understand
dissent as a valuable expression of a judge's authentic personality. But, as
I will also show, the turn-of-the-century literature's understanding of
dissent as either an expression of a judge's character or as a statement by
a judge as an individual also endured.
To find reasons that a dissenting opinion is more than a statement by a
judge as an individual, one need look no further than the prolific literature
on dissenting opinions generated by judges on America's highest
courts.'3 6 As these judges insist, dissent can play a number of institutional
134. Reporting Dissenting Opinions, supra note 12, at 285.
135. See Bowen, supra note 15, at 696.
136. See, e.g., ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
GOVERNMENT 14-19 (1955); William Brennan, In Defense ofDissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427 (1986);
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roles.137 A published dissenting opinion, for instance, may increase the
likelihood that losing parties accept the legitimacy of judicial adjudication
by holding out the possibility that they may prevail in subsequent
litigation; it may galvanize popular mobilization against unpopular
decisions, thereby providing a check on an otherwise democratically
unresponsive judiciary; or it may improve the quality of the reasoning in
majority opinions. The mere possibility of publishing a dissenting opinion
may give true unanimity more force when it is actually achieved and it
may encourage court majorities to be less broad in their holdings, forcing
them to consider the views of judges in the minority if they want to avoid
public expressions of disagreement."' The roles a dissenting opinion in
fact does play vary from case to case and are highly dependent on the
specific concerns and features of a legal system."' H.L.A. Hart's remark
Jesse W. Carter, Dissenting Opinions, 4 HASTINGS L.J. 118 (1952) (reflections of a justice of the
California Supreme Court); William O. Douglas, The Dissenting Opinion, 8 LAW. GUILD REV. 469
(1948); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Writing Separately, 65 WASH. L. REV. 133 (1990) (written
while a judge on the D.C. Circuit); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Role of Dissenting Opinions, 95 MINN.
L. REV. 1 (2010); Michael A. Musmanno, The Value of Dissenting Opinions, 29 PA. BAR Assoc. Q.
268 (1957) (reflections of a justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court); Antonin Scalia, Dissents,
OAH MAG. HIST. 18 (1998); Antonin Scalia, The Dissenting Opinion 1994 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 33;
Harlan F. Stone, Dissenting Opinions Are Not Without Value, 26 J. AM. JUD. SOc. 78 (1942). The
dissenting opinion is a favorite topic for leading judicial figures in other legal cultures as well. See,
e.g., Willi Geiger, Die Abweichende Meinung beim Bundesverfassungsgericht und ihre Bedeutungfjir
die Rechisprechung, in DIE FREIHEIT DES ANDEREN: FESTSCHRIFT FOR MARTIN HIRSCH 461 (Hans-
Jochen Vogel et al. eds., 1981) (reflections of a judge of the German Federal Constitutional Court);
Michael D. Kirby, Judicial Dissent-Common and Civil Law Traditions, 23 L.Q. REV. 379 (2006)
(reflections by an Australian High Court justice); Claire L'Hcureux-Dubd, The Dissenting Opinion.
Voice ofthe Future?, 38 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 495 (2000) (reflections by a Canadian Supreme Court
justice); Luzius Wildhaber, Opinions dissidentes et concordantes de juges individuels a la Cour
europeenne des droits de l'homme, in DROIT ET JUSTICE: MILANGES EN L'HONNEUR DE NICOLAS
VALTICOS 529 (Rdnc-Jean Dupuy ed., 1999) (reflections by a President of the European Court of
Human Rights).
137. Perhaps dissenting opinions even have value as "an appeal to the intelligence of a future
day," CHARLES HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 68 (1928), or as a strategy to
preserve a court's future legitimacy after a court's majority comes to be understood as having
committed grave moral error. Cf Anita S. Krishnakumar, On the Evolution of the Canonical Dissent,
52 RUTGERS L. REV. 781 (2000) (arguing that the canonization of dissenting opinions has allowed the
Supreme Court to reverse lines of its jurisprudence while preserving its institutional legitimacy).
138. Versions of all of these arguments are advanced in the sources cited supra note 136.
139. A full account of the dissenting opinion would need to explain it in the context of diverse
institutional variables, including the role of public reason-giving in a judicial system, cf MITCHEL DE
S.-O.-L'E. LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL
TRANSPARENCY AND LEGITIMACY 27-61 (2004) (arguing that public discursive reason-giving is
antithetical to the French judicial system's traditional account of its own legitimacy), and the possibly
competing values of judicial independence and judicial secrecy. See Julia Laffranque, Dissenting
Opinion and Judicial Independence, 8 JURIDICA INT'L 162, 168-69 (2003) (suggesting that in legal
orders where the executive is strong relative to the judiciary, the secrecy of judges' votes and the
absence of dissenting opinions are perceived as promoting judicial independence, while in legal
orders where judicial independence is conceived of as the independence of each individual judge from
other judges, dissenting opinions are perceived as a guarantee ofjudicial independence); see also Kurt
H. Nadelman, The Judicial Dissent, Publication v. Secrecy, 8 AM. J. COMP. L. 415 (1959) (comparing
different legal orders' resolutions of the tension between the values of deliberative secrecy and
publicity in adjudication). The form itself of the dissenting opinion varies greatly across jurisdictions
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that dissenting opinions "have no consequences within the system . . .
because no one's rights or duties are altered thereby"' 40 only holds if the
"system" is defined narrowly as the set of legal rules and not the
institutions through which law is pronounced and through which it
acquires social legitimacy.
A view of judicial legitimacy that places great importance on judges'
conscience and qualities of character, such as that of those concerned
about judicial bureaucratization, might even place great value on the
practice of published dissent precisely because it serves as a venue for
expression by judges as individuals. But by the time concerns about
bureaucratization of the judiciary arose, fractured majority opinions had
become a concern for the legal profession, clouding over the possibility of
seeing in separate opinions the expressions of an authentic integrated
person. Those writing on bureaucratization generally saw in dissent not
valuable expressions of personality but instead "mere selfishness"'"' or
the hollow work of judicial staffs.' 42 For Joseph Vining to realize his
desire to hear a person speaking through a judicial opinion, he needed to
imagine that "a multi-member institution can have a single voice."' 43 In
other words, the desire of these lawyers to understand a judicial opinion
as the work of an undifferentiated person was focused on opinions for the
court, those that had the force of law; therefore, there was little attraction
for them in the possibility of viewing a dissenting opinion as an
expression of authentic, integrated personality.
That earlier view of dissent, however, also persisted. At the same time
as many judges and academic lawyers worried about the bureaucratization
of the judiciary and criticized the fracturing of majority opinions, Justice
Brennan defended dissent not only as an assurance that each judge has
brought his or her "individual intellect[] to bear on the issues that come
before the Court,"144 but also because it might serve as a venue for public
and legal cultures, even where they are permitted. Since 1966, the Judicial Committee of Privy
Council has permitted only one collective dissent. See John Alder, Dissents in Courts ofLast Resort:
Tragic Choices?, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 221, 234 (2000). While in American courts an "opinion
of the court" is published, the author of even that opinion is identified by name, while in the current
German Federal Constitutional Court the author of the majority opinion is undisclosed while
dissenters sign their opinions by name. Further, some jurisdictions allow for oral dissents (indeed
entirely public oral deliberations) but do not provide for published dissenting opinions, see
Laffranque, supra, at 166 (discussing certain jurisdictions in Switzerland), while the United States
Supreme Court holds secret deliberations but allows for both written and oral dissents. See generally
Guinier, supra note 75; see also 8 CAHIERS DU CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL (2000) (symposium issue
with contributions on dissenting opinions in different jurisdictions and debating their merits).
140. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 138 (1961).
141. KRONMAN, supra note 105, at 343.
142. Id. at 346-47.
143. VINING, supra note 114, at II1- 12.
144. Brennan, supra note 136, at 435.
5332012]
27
Smith: Personal and Official Authority
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2012
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
expression of personal conscience. Justice Brennan celebrated "a special
kind of dissent" 45 "in which a judge persists in articulating a minority
view of the law in case after case presenting the same issue."l 46 This kind
of dissent, he admitted, stands in great tension with a judge's "duty to
acquiesce in the rulings of the court."l 47 Such a dissent, as Justice
Brennan wrote, instead must "constitute a statement by the judge as an
individual." 48
While excessive dissent could be imagined as a symptom of
bureaucratization, Justice Brennan's vision of dissent still resonates with
some important contemporary understandings of the practice. One
academic interpreting Justice Brennan has even speculated that there may
be "constitutional foundations for a judicial right to dissent," premising
the argument primarily on a judge's right as an individual "citizen not to
be compelled to join in a message with which s/he does not agree." 49 in
doing so, he conceives the judicial office as integrating a judge's personal
role (as a citizen) and official role in a way the Supreme Court, at least,
does not understand most administrative offices to do,'50 and as similar to
the integration of the personal and the official championed by the
opponents of judicial bureaucratization. Thus, even if they did not always
manifest themselves together, the understanding of dissent as an
expression of the judge as an individual survived into the twentieth
century along with the ideal of the judgeship as commingling a judge's
official and private selves.
IV. MODERNIZATION AND THE JUDICIAL OFFICE
A German scholar has suggested that dissenting opinions disappeared
from the German judiciary as it acquired the features of a Weberian
bureaucracy in which "personal features" had no place."' In such a
bureaucracy, we are told, dissenting opinions "are a relic from a pre-
modem procedure that could hardly be justified on rational grounds."' 52 If
145. Id. at 436.
146. Id. at 437.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Rory K. Little, Reading Justice Brennan: Is There a "Right" to Dissent?, 50 HASTINGS L.J.
683, 685 (1999); see id. at 696 (arguing that prohibiting dissent would "intrude on the judge's right as
a citizen" under the First Amendment not to join in a message with which he or she disagrees).
150. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) ("[WJhen public employees make
statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees arc not speaking as citizens for First
Amendment purposes.").
151. Gerd Roellecke, Sondervotum, in I FESTSCHRIFT 50 JAHRE BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT
363, 375 (Peter Bardura & Horst Dreier eds., 2001).
152. Id. at 373-75. Rocllecke's commentary reflects on the practice of dissenting opinions at the
German Federal Constitutional Court. This court and much of the German legal profession engaged in
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dissenting opinions ever are only statements by a judge as an individual,
the practice of their publication might indeed seem oddly anachronistic, if
one also accepts-as many of the opponents of judicial bureaucratization
appeared to do-a Weberian account of institutional modernization. The
commingling of the judge's personal and official selves championed by
opponents of judicial bureaucratization likewise ran counter to a
Weberian understanding of the norms governing modem officialdom.
That American institutions, and especially courts, are not perfect
instantiations of Weberian legal-bureaucratic authority is, of course, not
news.'53 Weber's influence has nonetheless been particularly palpable in
the historiography of nineteenth-century American officeholding. Many
historians have described officeholding in the early nineteenth century as
characterized by the weakness, or absence, of the distinction between the
personal and the official, while describing the end of the century as
dominated by an increasingly impersonal official role. Bernard Silberman,
for instance, has argued that the rise of "rational-legal" organizational
structures brought with it "the transformation of the administrative role,"
including in particular "the relationship of the individual to the office."' 54
Jerry Mashaw has described the "symbolic" change in nineteenth-century
public administration as "[t]he government's actions [became]
depersonalized and objectified. Administrative actions [became] the
actions of the United States, not the personal actions of longtime
incumbents;"' he has called the change the "objectification of office."15 6
perhaps the only debate over dissenting opinions that matched the intensity of the turn-of-the-century
American debate that this Article examines. For the proceedings of the forty-scventh Law Congress,
which eventually led to the adoption of dissenting opinions, see VERHANDLUNGEN DES 47.
DEUTSCHEN JURISTENTAGES (1968). Cf Ernst Friesenhahn, Referat zum 47. DJT 1968, in
VERHANDLUNGEN DES 47, supra, at R.33 (arguing that the "main reason" to permit dissenting and
concurring opinions is "to strengthen the personality of the judge, to put greater emphasis on the
judge in his personal dignity as the medium of the adjudication").
153. Weber himself described the American judiciary as differing in many respects from an
ideal-typical bureaucracy, among them that "in the American view, the judgment is the very personal
creation of the concrete individual judge, to whom one is accustomed to refer by name, in contrast to
the impersonal 'District Court' of Continental-European officialese," MAX WEBER, 2 ECONOMY AND
SOCIETY 890 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich trans., 1968), and that the value of an American
precedent, in Weber's view, depended on "the very personal authority of the individual judge" who
authored it. Id. at 316; cf VINING, supra note 114, at 17 ("Was one to treat as equivalent an opinion of
Holmes in Massachusetts and an opinion of what's his name in Wyoming? Of course not.").
Comparativists today continue to observe that American judiciaries, both federal and state, are
designed around a "coordinate ideal" with large degrees of discretion conferred upon lower-level
decision makers, a high degree of responsibility placed on lay officials (the jury), a relatively weak
emphasis on hierarchical appellate review, and a decidedly non-bureaucratic mode of selection and
promotion of judges. See, e.g., MIRJAN DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY
23-46 (1986).
154. BERNARD S. SILBERMAN, CAGES OF REASON: THE RISE OF THE RATIONAL STATE IN
FRANCE, JAPAN, THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN 4 (1993).
155. Jerry Mashaw, Administation and "The Democracy": Administrative Law from Jackson to
Lincoln, 1829-1861, 117 YALE L.J. 1568, 1617 (2008).
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Similarly, William Nelson has contrasted contemporary American
government where officials "maintain[] a sharp separation between their
official and private lives" with that of the early days of the Republic
where "power was exercised by those who conjoined private and public
authority to perform undifferentiated leadership roles." 57  And Matthew
Crenson has described the Jacksonian period as one in which the "official
duties of administrators were carefully separated from their private
activities,"'58 contrasting it with the Federalist period in which "the
principal reliance of government administration" was on the
officeholder's "fitness of character." 59  The distinction between the
personal and the official has also been used by those describing
transformations of officeholding in an earlier age of American
government. Gordon Wood, for instance, has described "office" in pre-
Revolutionary America as "an extension into government of the private
person," an understanding which, he argues, the Revolution put to an
end.160
For whatever reason, courts and the judicial office are usually left out of
these narratives of change in the nature of officeholding.161 As an
156. Id.
157. WILLIAM NELSON, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY, 1830-1900, at 2 (1982).
158. MATTHEW CRENSON, THE FEDERAL MACHINE 4 (1975).
159. Id. at x.
160. GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 84 (1992). Wood has
famously argued that the American Revolution, as "the most radical and most far-reaching event in
American history," put an end to the "early modern society" where "all aspects of life were
intertwined. The household, the society and the state-private and public spheres-scarcely seemed
separable." Id. at 8. Wood's assertion that early American society was "undifferentiated" in all its
domains places the personal/official distinction into a relationship with the two public/private
distinctions that have played so prominent a role in accounts of the nineteenth century-namely, the
distinction between (private) market and (public) government and that between the (private) family
and the (public) outside world. See generally HENDRIK HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE
POWER 192-204 (1993) (describing the division of corporations into municipal public corporations
and private profit-seeking corporations); CAROLE SHAMMAS, A HISTORY OF HOUSEHOLD
GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA (2002) (describing the decline of the household as the primary unit for the
organization of labor and political authority in North America); Nicholas Parrillo, Testing Weber:
Compensation for Public Services in Bureaucratization and the Development of Positive Law, in
COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 47 (Susan Rose-Ackerman & Peter L. Lindseth eds., 2011)
(observing that "legislators, by reforming the way officers were paid, made the absence of the profit
motive a defining feature of 'government"'); Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as
Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE. L.J. 2117 (1996) (describing the rise of understanding of the
family as "distinct from other spheres of social life" and as "a domain in which altruism and other-
regard prevailed" and contrasting it with an earlier world in which "the rights of persons in private
relations resembled the rights of persons in public relations"). In other words, Wood, like Luhmann,
appears to subscribe to an understanding of modernity as a state of "increasc[d] separation or
differentiation between interaction systems," see LUHMANN, supra note 123, at 77, and the work of
other historians of the nineteenth century provides, at least at a very abstract level, support for such an
understanding.
161. Cf Justin Crowe, The Forging of Judicial Autonomy: Political Entrepreneurship and the
Reforms of William Howard Taft, 69 J. POL. 73, 84 (2007) (suggesting that American political
development scholars have largely ignored courts because they have wrongly assumed that they lack
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increasing number of scholars have come to challenge the usefulness of a
Weberian framework to understanding American institutional
development, 16 2 the absence of the courts and the judicial office from such
narratives might not seem troublesome. The Weberian framework is, to be
sure, not without its difficulties, including its assumption of a relationship
among the many different concrete phenomena it includes under the
general heading of the separation of the person from the office.' 63 But
surely we need some general account of the change in the relationship of
judges to the judiciary as an institution over the nineteenth century, and,
for lack of a better alternative, a Weberian framework will likely be the
place from which we start." That dissent's nineteenth- and early
twentieth-century opponents formulated arguments that drew on a
distinction between the personal and official suggests the usefulness of a
Weberian framework in understanding American institutional
development. That these opponents failed and that an ideal of the judicial
office as integrating the judge's private and official capacities succeeded
in the late twentieth century suggests its limitations.
"the complex institutional fcatures-actors, structures, and rules-that make other political
institutions worth studying").
162. For a critical summary of some of the literature and problems involved, see William J.
Novak, The Myth of the "Weak" American State, 113 AM. HIST. REV. 752, 761 (2008); and David
Sugarman, In the Spirit of Weber: Law, Modernity and the 'Peculiarities of the English,' in 21
RATTSHISTORISKA STUDIER 217, 225-27 (1997). See also Parrillo, supra note 124, at 48 (contending
that "the Weberian narrative is inadequate to explain the rise of non-profit government in America").
163. Weber, for instance, understood the division between person and office to include both a
stricter separation between official property and personal property (including an increased use of
salaries to compensate officeholders) and a differentiation of the source of normative authority that
officeholders wielded. See supra notes 121-123 and accompanying text. Parrillo has complicated the
relationship between these two phenomena, arguing that the use of private bounties to compensate
American officeholders was in many instances "at the cutting edge of positivist rationalization." See
Parrillo, supra note 124, at 57.
164. Some aspects of changes in judicial officeholding are usefully explained by the sharpening
distinction between the personal and the official. For instance, at the beginning of the nineteenth
century in a number of states, judges retained court filing fees as a form of personal compensation.
See DAVID DUDLEY FIELD, RE-ORGANIZATION OF THE JUDICIARY: FIVE ARTICLES ORIGINALLY
PUBLISHED IN THE EVENING POST, ON THAT SUBJECT (1846) (arguing that the "taking of fees by
judges is an unseemly practice, tending to the perversion of justice"); LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 138 (2005). But cf SCOTT MESSINGER, ORDER IN THE COURTS: A
HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL COURT CLERK'S OFFICE II n.22 (2002), available at
https://public.resource.org/scribd/8763902.pdf ("Unlike the clerks, marshals, and district attorneys,
the judges of the federal courts received a fixed salary in licu of fees."). Meanwhile, many judges,
including federal ones, were also expected to pay their own incidental expenses, for example, for
travel, out of their own pocket. See James Pfander, Judicial Compensation and the Definition of
Judicial Power in the Early Republic, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1, 3-13 (2008).
This relatively weak distinction between personal and official property may also have found
reflection in the possibility that judges could hold a copyright in their opinions. This notion, Craig
Joyce tells us, had "substantial foundation" before the Supreme Court's decision in Wheaton v.
Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834). See Craig Joyce, The Rise of the Supreme Court Reporter: An
Institutional Perspective on Marshall Court Ascendancy, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1291, 1373 (1985).
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CONCLUSION: THE ENDURANCE OF DISSENT, PERSONAL JUDGES AND
IMPERSONAL LAW
By 1910, the legal profession had lost interest in the debate over
dissenting opinions. Dissents continued to be published (except, until
1921, in Louisiana's official reports). By 1917, an article in the American
Law Review could reflect, in the past tense, on how "quite a controversy"
over dissenting opinions had arisen in law journals and bar associations."'
The success of legal realism surely had much to do with why dissenting
opinions ceased to be a cause for concern among members of the bar.'66
As Robert Post has explored, when lawyers ceased to understand the law
as "a grid of fixed and certain principles designed for the settlement of
disputes" and came instead to understand it as "the site of ongoing
processes of adjustment and statesmanship designed to achieve social
purposes,"'16 then dissenting opinions came to seem less like a pernicious,
private indulgence because they emphasized law's "flexibility and
adaptability," 6 1 which were now seen as important virtues.
There were likely more immediate causes for the dissipation of the
bar's interest in dissent. For one, the Albany Law Journal, the leader of
the opposition to dissent, went out of publication at the end of 1908.169
For another, around 1905, at the very time the debate over dissenting
opinions began to fade, the energies of bar associations turned to
opposing the "judicial recall fallacy" and defending against the sustained
progressive assault on the courts.170 To be sure, dissenting opinions had a
165. Knight, supra note 58, at 481, 483. Articles on dissenting opinions were occasionally
published. See, e.g., Knight, supra note 58; Berto Rogers, Dissenting Opinions, 35 L. NOTES 149
(1931); Walter Stager, Dissenting Opinions, Their Purpose and Results, 19 ILL. L. REV. 604, 607
(1924). But these articles were hardly part of a national conversation and did not vigorously advocate
a prohibition on dissent.
166. Just as the sheer number of dissenting opinions did not appear to cause the controversy, no
reduction in the number of dissenting opinions appears to explain the decline in interest in dissent
later. If anything, dissenting opinions became more common. See Robert Kagan et al., The Business of
State Supreme Courts, 1870-1970, 30 STAN. L. REV. 121, 132 (1977) (finding that dissenting and
separate concurring opinions "appeared in 8.7 percent of all [state supreme court] cases in 1870-1900,
in 10.5 percent in 1905-1935, in 15 percent in 1940-1970"). Nor did dissenting opinions from the
most visible jurisdiction, the U.S. Supreme Court, become any more temperate. See, e.g., Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 106 (1911) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (implying that the majority's
decision "is a blow at the integrity of our governmental system, and, in the end, will prove most
dangerous to all").
167. Post, supra note 4, at 1274.
168. Id.
169. See Announcement, 70 ALB. L.J. 384, 384 (1908).
170. See JOEL B. GROSSMAN, LAWYERS AND JUDGES: THE ABA AND THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL
SELECTION 53 (1965) (describing the ABA's response to the campaign against the judicial recall as an
"intense, vituperative, almost hysterical propaganda offensive"); WILLIAM G. ROSS, A MUTED FURY:
POPULISTS, PROGRESSIVES, AND LABOR UNIONS CONFRONT THE COURTS 114 (1994) (noting that
between 1908 and 1912 California, Oregon, Arizona, Nevada, and Colorado adopted judicial recall
measures); SELECTED ARTICLES ON THE RECALL, INCLUDING THE RECALL OF JUDGES AND JUDICIAL
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role to play in the judicial politics of the late Progressive Era and of the
New Deal. By the 1920s, progressive and labor leaders regularly relied on
dissenting opinions to criticize decisions of the Court's majority and,
indeed, to challenge the very legitimacy of judicial review."' Meanwhile
the president of the American Bar Association worried that "much of the
current discontent [with judicial review] is caused perhaps by the
publication of dissenting opinions,"' 7 2 and Tennessee Senator John
Shields likewise attributed progressive hostility to the judiciary to "the
bad effect [that dissenting opinions] have upon the public mind
concerning the wisdom of the court and the certainty of the law."' 73
DECISIONS, at xl-xliii (Edith M. Phelps ed., 1915) (bibliography of extensive outpouring of articles by
bar associations decrying judicial recall).
171. See John P. Frey, Shall the People or the Supreme Court Be the Final Voice in Legislation,
29 AM. FEDERATIONIST 629, 634 (1922) (pointing to a "large number of dissenting opinions" and
remarking that the American trade union movement "has never been more vigorous or emphatic in
[criticizing Supreme Court decisions] than were the Supreme Court Justices who wrote dissenting
opinions"); Samuel Gompers, Editorial, 16 AM. FEDERATIONIST 49 (1909) (drawing support from
Chief Justice Holmes's dissent in Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 72 (1896), and vehemently
criticizing another Massachusetts decision after noting that "the dissenting judges in the case do not
go as far as they might have gone in attacking the decision, though their comments are trenchant and
vigorous"); Robert M. La Follette, Child Labor and the Federal Courts, 29 AM. FEDERATIONIST 469,
481 (1922) (remarking of Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), and Bailey v. Drexel Furniture
Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922), "[1]et the dissenting members of the Supreme Court themselves comment
upon the action of the majority of the court in these cases"); Latest Anti-Labor Decision of the United
States Supreme Court, 58 BROTHERHOOD LOCOMOTIVE FIREMEN & ENGINEERS' MAG. 571, 573-75
(1915) (quoting at length from dissenting opinions to criticize a Supreme Court ruling as no more than
"the result of the personal views influenced, as we have said, by training and temperament"); Jackson
Harvey Ralston, Shall We Curb the Supreme Court?, 71 FORUM 561, 565 (1924) ("point[ing] to the
repeated dissents" and observing that "[slurely if the majority had based their action upon definitely
understood constitutional principles, no differences of moment need have arisen"); cf Dissenting
Opinions Once More, HARTFORD COURANT, Oct. 23, 1911, at 8 (noting how ex-President Theodore
Roosevelt had invoked arguments of dissenting judges to criticize the courts and arguing that the
"publishing of dissenting opinions should cease").
In 1937 President Franklin D. Roosevelt would draw on dissenting opinions as he announced his
court-packing plan to the nation:
In the face of these dissenting opinions, there is no basis for the claim made by some members
of the Court that something in the Constitution has compelled them regretfully to thwart the
will of the people. In the face of such dissenting opinions, it is perfectly clear that, as Chief
Justice Hughes has said, "We are under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what the judges
say it is."
FDR's FIRESIDE CHATS 89 (Russell D. Buhite & David W. Levy eds., 1992).
Though the critics of the judiciary drew upon dissenting opinions as a weapon for their assault,
dissent may have actually entrenched the judiciary's centrality in the longer term. William Forbath
has explored how the American labor movement, in the course of its sustained confrontation with a
hostile judiciary, eventually "began to speak and think more and more in the language of the law,"
abandoning "radical republican claims upon government" to adopt anti-statist "rights" and "freedom-
of-contract" rhetoric. William E. Forbath, The Shaping of the American Labor Movement, 102 HARV.
L. REV. I 11, 1205 (1989). The ability of the judiciary to transform a political dispute into a "legal"
discourse-that is, one had in terms closer to those accepted by the courts-may have been aided in
no small measure by the resource of dissenting opinions: dissents provided labor and progressive
leaders with a set of arguments that would have supported outcomes similar to those they desired, in a
language and conceptual framework that was able to persuade judges.
172. John W. Davis, Present Day Problems, 9 A.B.A. J. 553, 557 (1923).
173. John K. Shields, Senator Condemns Legislative Efforts to Curb Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES,
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Unlike earlier, dissatisfaction with dissenting opinions aligned clearly
with desired substantive political outcomes. But members of the bar did
not advocate a total prohibition on dissent,17 4 perhaps out of unwillingness
to draw further attention to judicial fallibility or to the indeterminate
nature of law at the time of political assault on the judiciary."'
Throughout this Article, I have emphasized that dissents' turn-of-the-
century opponents not only expressed an anxiety that the publication of
dissent suggested that law was indeterminate, but also a concern that it
was inconsistent with the nature of courts and of the judicial role for
judges to express their disagreement in law reports. But, of course, courts
and judges are symbols of the law, and one of law's most fundamental
sources of legitimacy is its claim to impersonality-an ideal that its rules
should be the same no matter to whom they are applied or who is charged
with applying them. The turn-of-the-century lawyers' attraction to a
vision of courts as impersonal institutions thus flows from an ancient
understanding of the nature of law's authority. But what can be said of
lawyers' attraction, at both ends of the twentieth century, to an ideal of
personality in structuring the judicial role? Why have lawyers been
attracted to a seemingly paradoxical and perhaps anachronistic vision of
"a personalized judiciary that applies impersonalized rules?"' 6
I would venture that imagining the judgeship as personal has allowed
lawyers to temper what they perceive as the deficiencies in law's
impersonality. The subtle nuances in lawyers' appeals to the personal
authority of judges suggest that they have imagined those deficiencies in
different ways. At the beginning of the century, judicial hero worship may
have tempered lawyers' disquiet over the monotony of their practice or
their unease over the ends to which their clients' employed law.' 77
Apr. 15, 1923.
174. Canon 19 of the 1924 ABA Code of Judicial Conduct took what seemed to have been the
consensus position among lawyers during this period: dissents, while permissible, were not desirable.
It exhorted judges to "use effort and self-restraint to promote solidarity of conclusion and the
consequent influence of judicial decision . ... Except in cases of conscientious difference of opinion
on fundamental principle, dissenting opinions should be discouraged in courts of last resort." LISA
MILFORD, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA JUDICIAL CODE 137 (1992).
175. William Jennings Bryan used dissenting opinions to express dissatisfaction with majority
decisions during the period the bar was debating the propriety of dissent. See, e.g., Character Sketch:
The Presidential Candidates: Mr. McKinley and Mr. Bryan, 14 REV. REV. 113, 125 (1896) (quoting
Bryan at rally as saying, "They criticize us for our criticisms of the supreme court of the United
States. My friends we have not criticized. . . . If you want criticisms read the dissenting opinions of
court."). But Bryan's insistence that he was not criticizing the courts could hardly put lawyers, and
courts, on the defensive in the same way the assault that was to begin a decade later would. See ROSS,
supra note 170, at 35-37 (recounting how in his nomination acceptance speech, Bryan insisted that the
Democratic platform "contained no suggestion of an attempt to dispute the authority of the Supreme
Court" and went to great lengths in his campaign not to be seen as hostile to the judiciary).
176. Wald, supra note 108, at 769.
177. See sources cited supra note 103 and accompanying text.
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Towards the end of the century, Patricia Wald's aspiration to infuse
decisionmaking with personal values and common sense, like Owen
Fiss's insistence that a judge engage with each case as a matter of
personal conscience, suggested a desire for judges to temper the harsh
results to which impersonal law interpreted and applied merely in an
official capacity might lead. Joseph Vining's desire to hear a person
''speaking through" judicial opinions bespoke a longing to imagine a mind
ordering the legal universe, the possibility of which Vining felt necessary
to sustain faith in law.'78 His ambition was not to temper the harshness of
impersonal law in individual cases, but to understand law as rational and
just, not cold, chaotic, and arbitrary. In sum, law's impersonality may be
at tension with many of lawyers' other ideals, not least among them,
justice. Imagining "a personalized judiciary that applies impersonalized
rules"' 79 helps lawyers to believe those tensions can be reconciled.
In the years since the concerns over bureaucratization occupied a
central role in discussions of the projection of federal judicial authority, a
conservative legal movement has appealed to law's impersonality in
positioning its constitutional vision as the only alternative to "judicial
personalization of the law";'80 at the same time, leading conservative
jurists have played up the professional expertise possessed by judges.'
The social imagination of the judiciary is no doubt an unstable and
contested terrain. One of the forces shaping it is law's aspiration to
impersonality. Another appears to be the desire for a personal, non-
institutional face to judicial power.
178. See VINING, supra note 114, at 5 (suggesting law and theology are sister disciplines).
179. Wald, supra note 108, at 769.
180. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 863 (1989)
(contending that originalism helps prevent "judges ... [from] mistak[ing] their own predilections for
the law").
181. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Roberts Sets Off Debate on Judicial Experience, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
19, 2009, at Al4.
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